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**BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF FOREIGN
MILITARY FORCES**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2006

	Page
HEARING:	
Friday, April 7, 2006, Building the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces	1
APPENDIX:	
Friday, April 7, 2006	35

FRIDAY, APRIL 7, 2006

BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF FOREIGN MILITARY

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services	1
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services	3

WITNESSES

Edelman, Ambassador Eric S., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense	5
Hillen, Dr. John, Assistant Secretary of State, Political-Military Affairs, Department of State	8
Jones, Gen. James L., Commander, U.S. European Command, U.S. Marine Corps	11

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:	
Edelman, Ambassador Eric S.	39
Hillen, Dr. John	48
Jones, Gen. James L.	55
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
[There were no Documents submitted.]	
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
Mr. Hunter	65
Mr. Shuster	65

BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Friday, April 7, 2006.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I want to welcome our witnesses. We have with us today the Honorable Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Honorable John Hillen, Assistant Secretary of State, Political-Military Affairs, Department of State; and General James L. Jones, United States Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. European Command.

Gentlemen, thanks for being with us today. Thanks for your service, and especially during this very critical time for our Nation.

In a threat environment that has changed so radically, we must continually reassess our programs and policies to ensure that we prosecute the war on terror as effectively as possible. Today the committee will consider one program of special concern, the special authority, this recent authority that gives the Defense Department latitude in building the capacity of foreign military forces that partner with the United States to combat terrorism or carry out stability operations, or both, around the world.

The committee wants to be as supportive as possible in achieving the goal of enabling foreign militaries to carry out such missions so American troops can focus their energies in other arenas. We understand empowering foreign troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Republic of Georgia, to name but three examples, is an essential element of building allies' capabilities, helping to establish security, influencing local populations and ultimately winning the Global War on Terror.

Our support was manifested in the fiscal year 2006 Authorization Act in which Congress established a 2-year pilot program that gives the Defense Department the authority to use up to \$200 million to build the capacity of foreign military forces to undertake counterterrorism and stability operations.

And while we did enact this short-term fix, our intention was that it would serve only as a stop-gap measure, while the Administration could address the larger problem of how our ability to train

and equip foreign forces is arranged under the State Department's traditional foreign assistance programs, programs which have been characterized as unresponsive, slow, and cumbersome.

The State Department has more than \$4.6 billion in its fiscal year 2006 budget set aside for foreign military assistance, including the training and equipping of foreign military forces. And so one of the concerns of this committee is that recent legislative proposals to fund DOD train-and-equip efforts would divert money from the military services operation and maintenance budgets, adversely impacting our efforts to reequip and retrain our own troops.

The safety and effectiveness of American troops remain this committee's top priority. So we have, I think you can understand, some strong concerns that shifting money away from them and toward missions that have historically belonged to the State Department carry some problems for us. And that is why the congressionally authorized pilot program requires the Defense Department to use money from defense-wide accounts to avoid a situation in which services surrender funds needed to sustain important operations and maintenance.

And I think, General Jones, if you have been talking to your Marine Corps colleagues, some of those great folks that are running the operation in the warfighting theaters, you have probably seen the price tag on reset for those forces, and you have got correspondingly high price tags, I am sure, on the Army side as well. So that is something that we are very concerned about when we look at the potential diversion into train-and-equip accounts.

Also, aside from money concerns, there is also a long-term commitment and diplomatic element implied in the training and equipping of foreign militaries, another fact that recommends such a program remain under the State Department umbrella.

Training and equipping foreign forces is not an easy job, since this mission involves more than providing simple basic training, some weapons, and trucks. Building a competent, professional force also requires a government behind that force that is not wracked with corruption and that is capable of paying and taking care of its soldiers. Otherwise these soldiers will not be dependable in a crisis, as we have seen.

We may be encouraged by the task force led by U.S. Marines that recently completed training two Georgian logistics battalions. When they deploy they will be part of the international coalition engaged in Iraq stability operations. But we must also remember that we had to train the Georgian battalions twice because there were some dependability problems the first time around.

All of this goes to my key concern today. If our foreign military assistance programs are currently not flexible or responsive or comprehensive enough to meet this war's frontline demands, we need to look critically at how these programs are arranged, funded and implemented, and then make the necessary strategic and institutional changes.

We asked the Administration for recommendations to amend the foreign assistance laws in Title 22, the part of the U.S. Code that governs activities of the State Department, which is where a long-term solution must lie. So we would like to hear from you today about how you might address the shortfalls and challenges in the

larger foreign assistance program, because the longer we wait to address the root of the problem, the more difficult it will be to fix.

It seems likely that the need to train and equip foreign forces will remain a necessary mission as we continue to fight the Global War on Terror. We should therefore ensure that we can use the Federal funds intended for training and equipping foreign forces as easily and as quickly as situations on the ground demand.

So that, I hope, lays out some of our concerns and some of the focus we would like you folks to take today in your comments.

And before we go to our witnesses, let me turn to my good friend, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I think this hearing is a very timely one. I am sorry that more members are not here; but because votes were canceled, we know a good number of our members went home.

I thank the gentlemen for appearing today with us. Last year the Department lobbied us very hard to include additional authorities to train and equip armed forces of partner nations. After some consideration, we decided not to carry any of those expanded authorities within our bill. It was only through an extension process during the conference with the Senate that we were able to come to an understanding and provide some limited authority for the Secretary. That ultimately became section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act.

Already, I am told that the Department has been up to see our staff to lobby for relaxing the restrictions we put in place, before they have even tried to execute any programs under the existing authorities that we gave them.

The reason for these limitations were very clearly spelled out in the conference report. So let me, Mr. Chairman, quote it for a moment to make sure it fully registers:

“The conferees note that under current law, foreign military training programs are conducted exclusively under the authority of the Secretary of State.

“The conferees believe it is important that any changes in statutory authorities for foreign military assistance do not have unintended consequences for the effective coordination of U.S. foreign policy at large, nor should they detract from the Department of Defense’s focus on its core responsibilities, particularly the warfighting task for which it is uniquely suited.

“The conferees view the provision under this section of limited new authorities for the President, to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct such programs as a two-year pilot program.”

So, Mr. Chairman, we also were very careful to ensure that the Department was unable to raid moneys meant for the warfighters to do these missions, which is why we limited the transfer authority to the defense-wide operations and maintenance account.

Now, let me emphasize that while we clearly have some concerns about how these programs would be administered, where the

money comes from, and how proposed usage of these limited authorities fit into an overreaching, coordinated, geostrategic framework, I can understand the general need for such programs. In this Global War on Terror, we need all of the help we can find.

Where nations are willing to pony up resources, especially in terms of available troops, then we should do all we can to make sure that they are as well trained and well equipped as we can make them. Clearly no one is better suited to patrol the ungoverned spaces in Africa than the Africans, or mount operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan than the Pakistanis, for example. Not only will they be more effective than we could ever be, but it will also relieve at least some of the demand to deploy our own troops.

This pilot program is intended to be an opportunity for the Department to demonstrate a proof of concept before we consider wider authorities. And it is intended to give the Administration some flexibility in meeting emergency requirements, while it looks at what changes are needed in the way we orchestrate and provide foreign military assistance at large.

It may be that the existing mechanisms are not sufficient to meet the demands of the 21st century. But that does not mean we should be cobbling together bits and pieces of new authorities, ad hoc. It needs to be a measured process that protects us from unforeseen, unwanted, second- and third-order effects that can have an adverse strategic impact that would affect our country.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the hearing. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. So, gentlemen, thanks for being with us this morning. And I think you can see, at least from our opening statements, that this train-and-equip issue is important. Part of winning the war on terror involves empowerment, means empowering our allies and those who would fight terrorism to have the capability to carry on the battle. And we understand we have to do that. That is an important element of the war against terror.

On the other hand, it has to be done effectively and efficiently. And, there is—because it necessarily means working closely with the governments involved—there is what I would call a heavy diplomatic dimension to this train-and-equip program, which would seem to lend itself to a State Department direction.

And, last, I hope you can appreciate the concern we have with making sure that we do not come out of these warfighting theaters with a military that has equipment that is used up. That means that operation and maintenance have to be sustained for our forces, and that we look askance at programs that would pull money away from U.S. Marines and soldiers to train and equip, when we have a diplomatic arm—that is the State Department—which has a program which appears to have been shaped to carry on just what, in fact, DOD has been doing in some of these warfighting theaters.

So thanks for being with us. I think we have teed this ball up for you.

Ambassador Edelman, good morning. And what do you think here? And, incidentally, all written statements, gentlemen, will be taken into the record. So feel free to summarize.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ERIC S. EDELMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ambassador EDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, and other Members, thank you very much for giving us the opportunity to appear before you this morning. Before I start, I do want to thank you for the thought that you shared and that Mr. Skelton shared at the outset, and particularly for your support for our men and women in the field. I think that is an objective we all share.

I also am very pleased to be here today with my friend and colleague John Hillen from the Department of State, from whence I initially hailed before I came into my current responsibilities; and also with General Jones, with whom I have worked in the past closely when I was ambassador to Turkey.

Mr. Chairman, America faces adaptive enemies. We must also be adaptive and seize emerging opportunities in the Global War on Terrorism. And one such opportunity, as you noted, is the building of the capacity of partner nations to fight in the Global War on Terror; because, although we possess the finest military force in the world, this global war will not be won without the help of partner nations.

The President's recently released National Security Strategy calls for the transformation of America's national security institutions and for strengthened alliances to defeat global terrorism and to prevent attacks against the U.S. and our friends.

The NSS further states that effective international cooperation is dependent on capable partners. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, points out that the ability of the U.S. to work with capable partners to influence the global environment is fundamental to defeating terrorist networks. Wherever possible, the U.S. must enable allied and partner capabilities, building the capacity and developing mechanisms to share the risks and responsibilities of today's complex challenges.

The U.S. strategy in the Global War on Terror has three key elements: protecting the homeland; disrupting and attacking terrorist networks; and countering ideological support for terrorism.

Building partner capabilities contributes to all three of these elements. And it is the Global War on Terrorism's counterpart to President Roosevelt's arsenal of democracy.

During World War II, the United States shipped large amounts of supplies to allies such as England and Russia, taking advantage of the fact that these allies were often far better positioned to fight the axis. These supplies ensured that the allies maintained the means and morale to stay in the fight and helped reduce the number of U.S. casualties.

Today, enabling our partners to share the burden of the Global War on Terror produces many of the same results. Sending our troops into harm's way without competent military partners and security forces significantly increases the risks they may face.

The existence of capable partners, on the other hand, reduces stress on our military, as many global war on terrorism tasks, as Mr. Skelton noted, are best accomplished by and with partner nations who know the local geography, know the language and the culture.

Secretary Rumsfeld recently testified that it costs approximately \$90,000 a year to sustain a U.S. servicemember in theater, as opposed to about \$11,000 to sustain an Afghan soldier, or \$40,000 for an Iraqi soldier.

Additionally, helping our partners gain security capabilities helps us to reduce ungoverned areas, thereby depriving terrorist organizations of potential safe havens and allowing our partners to secure their national borders, restore legitimate authority, and establish the rule of law.

It is clear that building partnership capacity is an essential task. However, the train-and-equip authorities created during the Cold War are ill-suited to the adaptive, asymmetric, non-state threats that we are facing today. They cannot be relied upon to help us defeat the forces of global terrorism, we need some new, more responsive authorities to help us expedite the training and equipping of partner nations.

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned in your comments the experience we have had with Georgia. In October 2001, the President announced support for training Georgian forces to close terrorist safe havens along its borders. But because we were using outdated Cold War-era authorities, we had to struggle to meet this pledge, cobbling together seven different funding streams, working through two different agencies, and employing allied contributions as well.

It took seven months to begin the staff-level training, and tactical training did not begin until September 2002. Training four battalions took two and a half years, until May 2004.

However, once trained and equipped, the Georgian forces have made a significant contribution to the Global War on Terrorism. These troops took on the terrorist networks in their own Pankisi Gorge that we had a common interest with them in disrupting. And as an unanticipated benefit, many of these forces have subsequently deployed to Iraq. And today Georgia has 850 soldiers serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in support of coalition operations, which makes them the highest per-capita contributor among our coalition partners in the operation.

We need the authorities to help us build the capacity of partners like Georgia in a more effective and more timely manner. The section 1206 Partnership Capacity Building Authority granted in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006 was a very good start, and it reflects vision on the part of the Congress, and we welcome it. It allows the Departments of defense and state to work together to leverage the core competencies of both agencies.

We are currently in the early stages of the implementation of 1206, and the two departments, I can tell you, are working together in an unprecedented way. While section 1206 was a start, we do think it needs some improvement. I can outline for you some of the key challenges that we have found in working with the authority.

First is that the legislation limits us right now to national military forces when, in actuality, part of the struggle we face is dealing with a variety of security forces, gendarmerie, constabularies, internal security forces, border security forces. And those are some of the tasks that we face when we are out fighting the war on terror, and we need to expand the authority to include them.

It has been mentioned—and I understand the reasons that both the Chairman and Mr. Skelton articulated for limiting us to defense-wide operations and maintenance funds—but that represents a small fraction of DOD operations funds and does limit our ability to use the authority. We recognize the issues that were identified by the Chairman and Mr. Skelton, but it would be helpful to have access to a broader range of O&M funds.

Third, the authority is currently bounded by a number of foreign assistance restrictions and includes no waiver option for critical national security issues. We need some kind of waiver authority, either to be exercised by the President or the secretary of state as appropriate, in order to build the critical partnership capacity and use the authority in the way that we believe it was intended.

We have been limited, of course, in the amount of the authority. And while I recognize the force of Congressman Skelton's comment that this should be seen in some sense as a pilot project, which we are working through now, we would like to get the amount that we sought originally, in order to strengthen current preventative activities and also have some reserve in case of contingencies; because a great deal of what we are talking about is trying to deal with emergency situations not really foreseen in the normal budgetary process and cycle that we face.

The current language speaks about joint State-DOD formulation and implementation of programs. And I think my colleague, John Hillen, will testify to the fact that we are, in point of fact, doing this in practice. We are working with our State colleagues to develop mutually agreeable proposals aimed at states in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

However, the current authority requires a Presidential certification for each country, which is a time-consuming process that we are still undergoing. I think we would prefer a formulation that places authority at the secretarial level and works with the concurrence of the secretary of state.

We have developed together, State and Defense, proposed changes to the 1206 authority. And the Office of Management and Budget has cleared this proposal for transmittal, and the Department of Defense has submitted it to the Congress for consideration.

One of the issues that both the Chairman and Mr. Skelton raised was the question of renovating our foreign assistance program more broadly. And I think that is a worthy discussion. And I think that John and I, and I am sure General Jones from his perspective, will have some thoughts to share when we get into the discussion.

But I would emphasize that this is going to be a lengthy process. We are dealing with a system that was basically put in place 50 years ago. And I note that Mr. Skelton mentioned that it may be the fact that that system is not necessarily the one that we ought or need to have in the current environment. I agree with that. But it is going to take some time to work through exactly what we need to do to change that.

In the interim, I think we believe we need the changes to section 1206 that we have sought now, because if we cannot exercise this authority in the way that it was initially intended, I think it will impede our ability to enlist partners and our ability to reduce some

of the stress on the force and the danger to our servicemen and -women as we go forward.

Building partnership capacity is, I think, again to refer to something that both the Chairman and Mr. Skelton said, it is both a Title 10 and a Title 22 activity. And we think the current authority does give us a mechanism for establishing unity of effort between the two departments as we go forward. And there really is unprecedented cooperation going on in this area right now.

Mr. Chairman, let me just summarize by saying, in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, a number of fragile states were left in place. For a long time we tended to look at this as a purely humanitarian issue and a humanitarian challenge. But I think we have come to realize over the last few years that fragile states and ungoverned areas are a potential breeding ground for terrorism and safe havens for terrorist organizations.

The 1206 authority helps us to address that reality by leveraging and coordinating the strengths of both the departments of defense and state to build bipartisan capacity and help win the Global War on Terror, protect the lives of both our active duty forces and the national guard and reserves who are serving, those men and women overseas.

So I really welcome the opportunity to address this whole set of issues with you this morning. I am grateful that you have held this hearing, and I look forward to further discussion and answering your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Edelman can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hillen, good morning.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN HILLEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dr. HILLEN. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and Mr. Skelton and members of the committee for the opportunity to testify before you today. I always welcome the chance to appear before the House Armed Services Committee. I think part of breaking the paradigm of the old way we looked at national security is for committees to feel free to get involved across the whole spectrum of national security agencies. We really welcome the chance for the State Department to appear in front of your committee, and thank you for your own leadership.

And I also want to recognize Mr. Skelton, too. During my time as a military officer, and indeed now, I always return to his reading list for professional military education. And, Mr. Skelton, you should stop adding books to it, because every time I think I catch up to what you think people should be reading, another book pops on there. But you have been just influential in the development of a lot of military officers' careers.

The CHAIRMAN. Someday we are going to give Mr. Skelton a test on those books.

Dr. HILLEN. Mr. Chairman, this is an interesting moment in time. You have here in front of you a former career military officer

who is serving in the Department of State, and a career diplomat serving in the Department of Defense. And I think it not only says something about the way that our departments are working together these days, but also just about the nature of the security challenges we are talking about.

This is a security environment that is animated by threats that come as much from the big bunches of uneducated youth in countries that can't provide for political and economic opportunity as it is from traditional military threats that are manifested in terms of formations and military maneuvers. And I think the set of things we are talking about today are important ways to get at this new environment.

I will just briefly make a couple of points, Mr. Chairman, because I know you want to jump right into this. As you and Mr. Skelton mentioned, security assistance is such a critical foreign policy tool, especially these days, that allows the U.S. to advance its national security interests with our allies to our border goals and promoting key American values with respect to democracy, human rights, civilian rule of the military and so on. And, most importantly, security assistance increases the capacity of our military forces by providing the necessary funding and training to our coalition partners and friendly nations so that they can work toward common security goals and share burdens in joint missions.

That is not just the coalition piece, I think we should point out, which is important. We have over 40 nations with us in Afghanistan, almost 30 in Iraq, and 63 nations in the coalition on the war on terror. But also, you know, as we recognized, our victory in Iraq and Afghanistan will depend upon the growing capacity and capabilities of the Iraqi military and the Iraqi police and the Afghan military and the Afghan police. We recognize that that is the key to victory.

And the State Department, specifically my bureau, has the policy lead on developing and implementing security assistance. We do that through the foreign military financing program, the international military education and training program, and our peacekeeping operations. And I want to really emphasize Ambassador Edelman's comment that this is done together.

At the end of the day, we have the authorities and the policy lead and responsibility. We build these things from the ground up. In fact, next week we will start a series of roundtables in which all of the combatant commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), joint staff, all of the regional bureaus of the State Department, development people from United States Agency for International Development (USAID), everybody is represented. We built these programs from the ground up together.

But in addition to these three traditional capability building programs, the State Department welcomes the opportunity to work closely with our defense colleagues in formulating plans for using the 1206 train-and-equip authority.

The State Department continues to support the new DOD authorities, such as 1206 and 1207, because these authorities augment the tools available to both secretaries to act quickly when unforeseen events or new opportunities make the initiation or expansion of a training, equipping, or advisory program necessary.

And in the case of supporting select DOD authorities, the Administration is seeking to maximize the use of complementary resources and capabilities in various agencies in ways that will best serve the Administration's overall goals of providing comprehensive, integrated assistance. These authorities received a joint endorsement from the secretaries of state and defense, and are exactly the kind of flexible tools we need to win the long war.

And I would just say, Mr. Chairman, it has been mentioned before, that the old authorities are perhaps slow and unresponsive. I would characterize them as deliberate. They happen within a context, a very deliberate foreign-policy context that takes in a lot of considerations, and they are very strategic. And that makes them at times, and because of the number of people involved and the democratic process surrounding them, makes them less flexible than we might need.

And also, just to add a slightly different perspective on some of these authorities, I wouldn't necessarily call them ill-suited, but I would say with the challenge we are facing today they are partially suited. They get us some of the way there in addressing mostly our traditional security concerns, but for the new security concerns, more flexibility is indeed needed. And we hope that Congress will continue to lend its support to these and other flexible authorities requested by the Administration.

I have been very personally joined in joint formulation and approval of the plans for using 1206 in fiscal year 2006, and we are getting to the point where we have some very solid plans that will go directly to helping us in the Global War on Terror. And state and DOD coordination throughout this process has been excellent, and we look forward to briefing this committee soon with our final proposals on those.

And, Mr. Chairman, I will take you up on your opportunity to submit the rest of my statement for the record. But I just want to summarize by saying that I think that we have a terrific opportunity here to layer on top of some things we already do well, to continue to talk about reform of those, because we need to continuously challenge the status quo to stay one step ahead of the folks that would do us harm.

We have a very adaptive observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop, if you remember that.

Their decision cycle is flexible and adaptive. I think we need to continuously in our business challenge the status quo, so that we constantly have our men and women in the field and Americans back home prepared to have the sort of tools that we need, that our government can deploy to defend.

And capacity building is one of the most important ones. I look forward to working through this whole set of issues with you and your committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Hillen.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hillen can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

The CHAIRMAN. General Jones, welcome back. It has not been long here. Thanks for your service to our country and the leadership you are providing now. And give us your perspective on this problem.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS**

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It is indeed a pleasure to be back in front of this committee. And I certainly enjoyed the opportunity to testify just a few weeks ago. During that testimony, I alluded to the fact that in this very different world in which we live, it is going to be incumbent upon the United States, I think, as it wishes to continue to be a Nation of great influence and, obviously, to prevail in the battle of the asymmetric threats that face us—not only nationally but collectively, internationally—to find the ways in which we can be more agile and more flexible in bringing our national goals to fruition.

I think this 1206 legislation is one of those ways. But I think that we are going to have to adopt essentially a new way of looking at things and doing things in order to be fully competitive in the international playing field. And let me explain that just a bit.

In the old days—and I would say the old days go back to not more than maybe 10 or 15 years ago—the United States was able to bring tremendous pressure on the behavior of different nations simply by withholding various types of assistance.

In general terms, it seems to me that the easiest thing to do was to cut off military-to-military relations with somebody who wasn't behaving the way that we would like to have them behave.

That may be the easiest thing to do, but it can be shown, I think in historical terms, that it might not be the most effective thing to do in terms of the long term if you look at our relations today with Pakistan and Indonesia, two countries that we virtually terminated mil-to-mil relationships with over policy disputes. It had the effect of essentially creating almost a generation of officers in those countries that have no ties with the United States.

The other thing that I would say that has changed is that we are faced with—the nations that we deal with have more choices to make and can turn to other suppliers. And in my previous testimony, I think I mentioned the rise of China as a very active player in Africa, for example.

Holding nations accountable to a certain standard of behavior is certainly something that the United States wants to continue. But at the same time, we also need to bring about new forms of assistance that we can bring to bear in short order, and not to wait months, in some cases years, to bring about programs that will help like-minded nations, willing nations, to assist us and to join us in the battle against our common threats and the international objectives that we have.

I think it is particularly important for us and for our allies, in particular North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—I am also very active in the NATO transformation—but it is very important to understand how crucial it is to be proactive in our engagement, as opposed to reactive.

And while you cannot be everywhere nationally, with the interlocking relationships that we have of like-minded nations, both developed and undeveloped, we are seeing the proactive engagements, such as in Georgia, train and equip; such as in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative; perhaps some new initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea to prevent greater problems in the future.

Proactive engagement is always cheaper than reactive engagement. And we are seeing in the NATO organization, an organization that is moving to be more proactive earlier, so that we can prevent and deter future conflicts, which are always much more expensive and much more longer lasting.

So I think there is great value in being able to have the capability to be agile and flexible. As a combatant commander now with about three years under my belt, I can tell you that I feel like I have all of the responsibility I need, but I have very little authority over resources.

And as I look back at the maze of the programs that we have and interlocking bands of discussions that have to go on to start a program from concept to fruition in almost anything that we do, I worry that over time we are becoming very hard to work with, harder to work with than perhaps our competition. And we will see increasing instances of countries basically saying this is too hard and I can get what I need from somebody else a lot easier.

So it is something that I think we need to address, I think we need to think about. This 1206 legislation is a good step. I think it is a good test. And we should watch it carefully and make sure that it has its intended effect. I think it will.

I think the programs that I know from the European Command, we have submitted for consideration ours, which will be immediately useful. I think I mentioned to the committee the last time that one of the great things that is going on in the North African, sub-Saharan African region right now is that we are, for a very, very little amount of investment, actually making a huge contribution by helping those governments help themselves to understand what is going on in their borders to prevent the spread of terrorism and the recruiting that is going on. And using our limited assets, but to great effect, we are actually having a strategic change, in my opinion, in the way that that section of the Islamic world perceives the United States. Things are changing dramatically.

We are building new friends, new partnerships, and we are doing it for an amazingly low amount of investment. This is what I mean by proactive engagement with our like-minded nations.

The cost of providing United States battalions for the Georgian battalions that we trained, I would submit again, another modest amount of money. The cost of the United States battalions that would have had to take the places of the Georgian battalions that are coming on line would be much more expensive. So I see it as a type of program that buys insurance and that allows us to help others help themselves at a faster rate.

And I would also use another example where how you control your resources is critically important. I think one of the critically important things that happened in Afghanistan is empowering our provincial reconstruction team commanders to have the power and the authority to do things, to do things that are good for the people, that are immediately visible, and the provincial reconstruction team commander in Afghanistan is a very important person and important to the people, important to the region. It is the most visible expression of commitment, because he has the authority to do things on the spot. And I think if we gradually migrated over to an attitude of centralized planning with more decentralized execu-

tion, all of the oversight that is required, that goes without saying, I believe that we can achieve a lot more in the global playing field in this asymmetric world than we are currently achieving, simply because we have not adjusted our systems for about 45 years.

So I am delighted to be here to talk about this, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to be with you. I look forward to our discussions. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, all written statements will be taken into the record. Thank you, General Jones, for your statement.

[The prepared statement of General Jones can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. We will go into a classified briefing status at the end of our open questions. At that point we will clear the room. We will ask any—we may have a few classified questions. So if you have got them, tee up your open questions for this period.

And let me just ask one quick question and move on to my colleagues.

General Jones, the reset costs for the U.S. Marine Corps, an organization for which you have some empathy, have been estimated at around \$12 billion. If you get \$10 billion out of a combination of supplementals and a base bill, and you are a little light, and you have a chance of getting another billion or \$2, which otherwise might go to train and equip, and you look across the aisle and you see the State Department with a \$4.8 billion account for train and equip, what are your druthers? Wouldn't you rather see the State Department pick up the tab and let you—let the U.S. fighting forces get that reset money?

General JONES. Well, I think that obviously these either/or situations are hard to answer. If the commandant were sitting here, I know exactly what he would say, and I know what I would say in his position.

I think we have to find the agility, frankly, to do both. I think it is that important. And I think that the role that the United States plays in the world, and the role that the United States plays in investing correctly in the these nations that are struggling to move toward democracy, if we are successful in that venture, that is probably a country where we might not to have to fight in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we all stipulate to that. The empowerment of forces, training and equipping allied forces to fight the war against terrorists makes sense. Let's all stipulate to that.

Now, the question is, who picks up the tab? Certainly training and equipping another country's forces is a—what would traditionally be considered to be a specie, if you will, of foreign aid. It is aid to another country. It is not money that goes directly into the equipage of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps.

So, stipulating to the fact that we need to train and equip, and that that is good for us, and that that is in our long-term interest, wouldn't you rather see the State Department pick up the tab for that than the Department of Defense, which is going to be strapped coming out of these warfighting theaters?

General JONES. Certainly. I am not trying to be evasive, Mr. Chairman. But from where I look at the world, what I would like

to see, if I were king for a day, is to try to see more symmetry and more simplicity in how we are organized.

Who pays for it is—it is the same—the American taxpayer is providing the money. But if I look at the matrix that we have to deal with, from Title 10 to Title 22, and the complicated aspect and the overlapping aspects of both of these programs, it is very tough for me to say it should be the State Department or the Defense Department.

We need some agility in our programs and some simplicity that seems to be lacking, to me, from where I am sitting right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hillen, what do you think? Wouldn't you folks rather pay for this than take it out of the military hide?

Dr. HILLEN. Well, Mr. Chairman, you know I would love to answer the call from General Jones and say, "I got it for you," not only because he is much bigger than I am, but we like helping our folks in the field.

You know the Secretary's frustration with security assistance, and of course you know she is making some pretty bold moves on the foreign assistance in general with the new appointment of a director of foreign assistance, whose agenda is a reform agenda. But just over the years, it has become not a very discretionary tool. About 94 percent of foreign military financing is earmarked these days. In fiscal year 2005, 100 percent of it was earmarked. We need to continue to work with our colleagues in both houses on the hill to see how discretionary and flexible we can make these tools.

And so when you look at what we have there, and it has seemed over the course of time and the pedigree of these programs over the past, really generation of these programs, it seems harder to stop them than to start them. And they get momentum. And they get put into law. And they get put into practice, and there are powerful rationale and constituencies for continuing them, and then when we need the flexibility to react quickly, respond in the field to commanders on the ground—I just got back from Afghanistan, and a commander on the ground needed to deploy some train-and-equip authority, foreign assistance tool—in that existing process, a long-term, deliberate, strategic process, we do not have the flexibility to respond quickly to answer that call for those needs.

This allows, this sort of authorities allow us together, state and defense, with concurrence of both Departments, to be able to respond with more flexibility. I think over the long term here, you are absolutely right; we have to find flexibility and reform it within the system. But at this point in the time now, we definitely need some interim solutions that allow us to support what is going on out in the field.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Ambassador, thank you also for being with us. Stipulating that we need to have agility, flexibility, and the train-and-equip makes sense, wouldn't you like to see the State Department pay for these programs?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, I largely agree with my colleague, John Hillen. In an ideal world, we would want a foreign assistance system that enabled us to move quickly to do this. We do not have that right now. We face some immediate challenges. And I think these authorities allow us to fill the gap, if you will, that exists in our ability to respond quickly.

The other point I would make, I think it was explicit in what General Jones said, is that these moneys are highly leveraged. I mean, there is an enormous benefit.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true. But they would be highly leveraged if they came from the State Department as well as DOD. They would not lose their leverage.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I agree, sir. I was just making the point that as you look at the trade-offs, and we always have to look at trade-offs, there is high leverage, and high leverage for the Department of Defense as well, because of the additional capacity that gets brought to bear; or, as General Jones was saying, the better border security.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. Okay. Thank you.

The gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

General Jones, you mentioned the importance of military-to-military contact. And I have witnessed this, particularly in the professional military education arena, but not limited to that. And you gave us an example of the fact that a whole generation of Pakistani officers have had no contact with ours, because we cut off military-to-military contact.

What test would you suggest that a nation should meet in order to have military-to-military contact, or exchange, or whatever the form might be, in the event that there are policy differences. In the old days as you termed, 10 to 15 years ago, we would just cut it off?

Would you have a different standard or a different test for our military contacts, because they are so very important? I know this, and I think everyone realizes that. Do you have a suggestion?

General JONES. Well, I think it is situational, sir. I think we just have to be very careful about the law of unintended consequences. It seems to me that it is a very easy thing to do. And it seems to be the first recourse that we tend to pull out of our bag, saying, okay we are cutting off mil-to-mil contacts.

And sometimes—not always but sometimes—that just reinforces the behavior that we are trying to change. In other words, if it is a military problem, and if the military is behaving badly—for instance, in human rights and the like inside a nation, and there are circumstances that are clearly beyond the pale, then I think we have to measure the actions that we take against the behavior we are trying to modify.

But in the meantime, I think if a nation is generally progressing, if we are teaching and helping nations develop militaries that act in support of human rights, the defense of democratically elected institutions, and have a willingness to work with us and seek out our leadership and our assistance, then these are good things.

And we have seen quite a few years in the world where the consistent application of relationship on the military-to-military basis has really changed the landscape for us. So I think the standards will be developed nation by nation.

I would just simply say that sometimes the easiest thing to do, which is to basically alter military-to-military relationships, sometimes in the long term may not work out quite the way we intend it to be. So I would just caution against using it too quickly.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, let me ask you, what are your plans to use the authorities we gave you in section 1206? Of the \$200 million that we authorized, how much has been allocated for projects thus far?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Mr. Skelton, we are working our way through that, as I mentioned, with the Department of State now. My hesitance in specifying exactly what we are doing goes to the issue of the requirement that we have to get a Presidential certification. And we have not yet moved to the White House the list of projects that Secretary Hillen and I and our respective staffs have been working on.

We have projects, I believe, right now that will be close to the \$100 million mark, that we are preparing to move forward. And because I do not want to presume on the President's decision-making authority, I would not want to get into specifics. But I can tell you that they are broadly in geographic areas that one might expect: the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific area, and that they go to a lot of counterterrorism-capability building, maritime security efforts, border security efforts, et cetera.

But because the President has not even seen these yet, I wouldn't want to go further and comment on it.

Mr. SKELTON. My recollection is there was a request for some \$700- or \$750 million before. What would you have used that money for had we given it to you?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Congressman Skelton, I think our judgment is—well, let me back up one second. The way we have approached the \$200 million has been to solicit, from General Jones and the other combatant commanders, proposals; and then worked with policy folks at state, working through their embassies and our side, to prioritize and reach agreement on the proposals.

I believe it is our judgment from what we have seen from the combatant commanders that we could get up to \$750 million in projects. What we have been doing initially is getting a set of priorities.

But I believe if we had the \$750 million authority, we could execute it, if given the time.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say, before I ask a question, that I support the concepts embodied in the 1206 section provisions, and I guess I would just like to say why. It just seems to me that as we live and work in the world we live in today, our military leaders have recognized the way we need to do business.

In the Marine Corps services, in all the services, for example, we spend a lot of time training our military folks who deploy in language skills. We train them in cultural awareness, and we train them to, in effect, be ambassadors more so than any time, any time in history. Military folks have always been ambassadors, but it is perhaps more important today than it ever has been because of the nature of the fight that exists in the Middle East and the potential for activities in other parts of the world.

So, it seems to me that military-to-military contact with other peoples is extremely important. To the extent that we can foster those, I think, through the military, we ought to be doing it.

To a great extent we have been successful. My observations, in having been to theater several times, I remember spending a day with General Petraeus early in the training process in Iraq, and he was proud of what he was doing, but, more importantly, the people, the Iraqis that he was training, were more proud of what they were doing. And I remember seeing the skill level exhibited by the Iraqis who, back in the early days, after having watched our soldiers train and carry out operations, and watching the level of capability that the Iraqis had back then, I thought, I hope they progress.

Sometime later, when I visited the Iraqi troops in Balad, I saw a tremendous difference, and people who were very proud of the progress that they had made as a result of our military-to-military training, and it was something that I think was very important. I will tell you, the reason I think it is so important is because every American, every one of my constituents, and every American that I know wants our soldiers to come home, and the only way we are going to do that is by having Iraqis who participate in their government and who participate in their national security.

There is no more important mission today in Iraq or Afghanistan than training indigenous folks to take care of their country and to take care of themselves. So this is not a question for me. I believe this is extremely important and a program that I support fully.

Here is the problem, here is what is on the Chairman's mind, on both of our minds. In the 1960's, we peaked our military funding at nine percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). In the 1980's, during the Reagan military buildup, we peaked our military spending at six percent of GDP. What is on our mind today is that we are at 3.9 percent in this long war; 3.9 percent of GDP is what we are spending on all the activities in the Department of Defense.

So what is on the Chairman's mind is how can we afford to do this? He and I have a little bit of different perspective on it, perhaps, because I think it is extremely important. I think it is probably the most important thing we have to do to get our folks home. But that doesn't change the fact that we are strapped at 3.9 percent of GDP on military spending. It seems to me that the funding aspect of this is extremely important.

I am going to support these provisions, and I think they are important. I guess I would just ask this question: are we looking for ways to share this burden with the State Department, or how are we going to move forward so that we can carry out all the traditional military missions we have, and this new mission, which is so important, as I think I have expressed?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Mr. Saxton, if I could, I would be happy to take a whack at that one. First, I agree with you completely about the observations you made about Iraq. From a personal point of view, it also corresponds to my experience when I was there in October and met with General Dempsey and some of the Iraqi security forces. I couldn't agree with you more, and I completely agree that is the way to bring our folks home.

On the broader question, I would say that in an ideal world, much of this activity would move to the Department of State and—

in a system that is reformed, as John Hillen said, Secretary Rice, I think, very much has this on her mind. I know that Randall Tobias, the new head of the Agency for International Development, who now carries the title of director for foreign assistance, has this on his mind.

I have met with Ambassador Tobias. We have talked about this. I think this is something, going forward that he will be looking at very hard. I think the problems that we face go to the issue that you mentioned about level of national effort and making sure that we have adequate funding across the board for all these activities.

As John mentioned, it is very difficult for him and for Deputy Secretary Zoellick and for Under Secretary Joseph and for Secretary Rice to effect effectively address some of these crucial things that come up on short notice if they have 100 percent of their foreign military financing (FMF) budget earmarked, and there is no discretionary monies available.

We will face down the road—and I think it is worth mentioning—as we look to complete the training of the Iraqi security forces and the Afghan security forces, the difficult issue of how do we sustain the enormous investment we have made in both blood and treasure in the lives of the folks who have perished in this effort over a period of time.

That is going to require resources, and it is going to require, as we move away from the train and equip mission, to more classical security assistance mission. Large amounts of money, at the current levels they have of discretionary funding, would dwarf what is in the budget. We are working our way through that. We are going to have to try to figure out what the answers are on that.

On the broader question of are we working together with the Department of State, the answer is, yes, we are. Even as we speak, our colleagues, John's and mine, at state and defense are finishing up a conference that we had at National Defense University (NDU) the last couple of days to look at how do we make sure that the security cooperation activities that General Jones and his colleagues among the combatant commanders are conducting as part of their regular activity, guided by the secretary of defense's security cooperation guidance, are moving in the same direction and the same strategy and getting the maximum benefit for the U.S. taxpayer that John and his colleagues are doing through the FMF, foreign military sales (FMS) and international military education and training (IMET) processes.

I am sorry that Mr. Skelton isn't here, but just as an unsolicited advertisement for IMET, as a two-time ambassador I will tell you if you polled my ambassadorial colleagues, I think they will say that there probably is no more highly leveraged asset in the IMET program. It does pay dividends into the future. General Jones mentioned the lost generations in Pakistan and Indonesia.

So the answer is we are working together to try and make sure that we are doing the right things, together as agencies, and to work more cooperatively, and to get the burden allocated appropriately. But we do have this time period we are going to face. I cannot tell you at this stage how long it will be, because it is to some degree dependent on how long it takes to reform the overall

foreign assistance process. But we will face some time where we will need to be as flexible and agile as our opponent is.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I would just make one final observation. John Kline and I had an opportunity last evening to spend some time with a great Marine whose name is G.I. Wilson, a colonel who has been deployed in Iraq twice. If he were here and able to be part of this conversation, he would also say there is no more important thing in developing relationships with the Iraqis.

In fact, he has been dinging at me to go back to Iraq, and he wants to go with me so he can introduce me to the people, to the Iraqis that he had contact with that he had an influence on, and obviously they had an influence on him as well.

So these personal relationships that are developed with military-to-military and military-to-civilian contact in theater are extremely important. I just think that we need to move forward with that understanding. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Jones, it is always good to see you, Mr. Ambassador and Dr. Hillen.

I particularly—Dr. Hillen, I just wanted to thank you for your appearance before our small committee, the committee on QDR. I know you had just taken on your role at that time. I appreciate your comments very much.

In light of that, I wonder if you could help us understand a little bit more the implications for our foreign policy in the context of section 1206 assistance. I appreciate the fact that you have been at the Pentagon, and, ambassador, you also have shared roles. I think it is important that occur. Yet we know that there is a different complexity perhaps. There is a reason why we have a State Department. I think we would all agree on that.

What do you see, then, in terms of the real implications of this policy from your point of view, and are there some aspects that, in fact, the State Department might be ceding over to the Pentagon here, and what would your concerns be about that?

Dr. HILLEN. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. I appreciate the question. It gets right to the heart of one of the major matters here. Our secretary of state wouldn't have signed up for the first letter on a page of this agreement or any other agreement if she didn't feel that this was all going to be conducted within the context of foreign policy that she and her successors are responsible for. That is important to note.

Security assistance is assistance, it is foreign assistance, as the Chairman pointed out, and that is the responsibility of the Department of State. She is very firm on that. The mechanism that we have worked out between the two departments for concurrence effectively gives the State Department and secretary of state veto power over the application of 1206 funds.

Her guidance—and, once again, she has got a very long view of this. It is important that it not be personality-driven by the current personalities, but it is something that if it endures is a legitimate tool for her successor and on and on. Her guidance is that we have

some restrictions with an inflexible system right now. We want to be able to answer the calls from the combatant commanders and be able to provide resources quickly in these general directions.

If we can find a mechanism working with our colleagues at DOD, these other resources in concert with them to do that, and we are involved in the decision process early and often and ultimately with concurrence, then we are making the decisions. You can even look at it as we make the decisions about a core capability of ours with somebody else's resources, which is a good thing for us.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Could you perhaps, really, in the short amount of time that you all have been working with us, just give us an example of where that has worked really well, and where, in fact, you think it hasn't?

Dr. HILLEN. We haven't seen it yet. We have disagreed on some proposals. We have disagreed on perhaps the scale and breadth of some of the proposals. For instance, when we started looked at and we started the processes, sort of working through the proposals that we were going to soon place in front of the President for where we would spend 1206 money this year, there were healthy disagreements about policy, about law, about priority, about the impact on other things, and we did it all within a very, very large foreign policy-driven context.

Both sides have—as I said, both sides have implicit veto authority, and we worked through some of it all. It was a good exercise just in general for planning, but it was also, I think, a pretty dramatic manifestation of a recognition that the nature of the security challenges today means that we are all in the national security business. Development people are doing national security. People doing the pandemic of AIDS are doing national security. Migration specialists are doing national security.

Our projects—as the ambassador said, these projects that we hope the President will approve will be in front of the Congress soon. I think you will see we are very oriented on near-term opportunities on the Global War on Terror in ungoverned spaces, in critical places to make a critical security impact tomorrow. Our deliberate long-term strategic system through which we usually run the security process, the State Department can't work quickly enough to give us that kind of flexibility.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think from—on the discussion we had before as well, I became sensitive to the idea that in the military we certainly have people who have trained longer and have a certain agility and staying power out in the field that, in fact, the State Department does not have. I know that the Secretary is working with those realities, and that, I would think, is also going to be an important factor in the ability to complement one another in a more forceful way.

Dr. HILLEN. You know her. She is not shy, and she is invested in this process, and she feels confident that her authorities are not only not being infringed upon, she thinks her authorities have grown by the ability to work with another department and things that we are planning and approving.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was going to ask a question of General Jones, but perhaps we will have time later.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead. We can take one more question.
 Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. General, I wonder if you could speak briefly on why we shouldn't focus more of our efforts on getting authority and funding for nonmilitary training and equipping rather than the military necessarily taking on the task of training foreign police forces as opposed to military forces.

General JONES. Well, I think that there is certainly going to be some aspects of our total involvement that are going to call for diverse types of training. It is not—we are not in a world where one size fits all.

For example, one of the best results in Afghanistan has been the U.S. leadership in training the Afghanistan Army. One of the colors it is trailing has been the development of the police force, which is currently under the leadership of another country. But the way ahead in Afghanistan is to obviously continuing the Afghan Army, but to bring up the other pillars of that society that also have to do well, and that is judicial reforms, the training of the police force, and obviously beginning to have some impact on the dependency on narcotics and the impact that has on the Afghan economy.

So I do think in many countries the training police is going to be very important. How we do that, who does that is very important, and how we pay for it has to be discussed.

But I would not rule out that having some aspect of military cooperation will border into some other areas, because you cannot treat these things as stovepipes and pretend they don't exist. One of the interesting evolutions in NATO, for example, as we go into Afghanistan, my authorities—which were previously nonexistent in the world of narcotics—NATO is going to have a passive role, but nonetheless an evolving role, in making sure that the efforts in countering narcotics we do have overwatch responsibilities, we do have information-sharing responsibilities, we do have awareness responsibilities to try to make this a success. Those words are now in the operational plan.

So I think it is extremely important to have the flexibility to do the right thing and to bring the elements of national power to bear in those regions and at the time when it is critically required in this flexibility. The flexibilities that we can get to do that means that we will have, I think, a more rapid response and an earlier achievement of our goals.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen. I hate to admit that I am as confused as I am about who is paying for what and doing what to whom and what 1206 is going to do about all of that. So we don't have much time, but I am wondering if we could use the example—General, I will start with you—on the Trans-Saharan Initiative that you have got going on. There was a lot going on there, but certainly there is some training and equipping that is going on.

Could you, in a sort of scrunched-down version, sort of tell us how that works now, who is paying for what? You have got some limited number of forces, and we have, as you pointed out, a lim-

ited number of assets we are spending to great effect, and perhaps when we get in the classified version, we can talk about some detail. But just in general, how is that working now? How are your forces that are there, or that work with the country team and the ambassador—who is paying for what? I am not limited to General Jones, I am just starting with General Jones.

General JONES. Well, TSCTI was a product of the work of the European Command going back a few years that started out in fiscal year 2005 with about a small \$6.8 million investment.

Mr. KLINE. Defense money.

General JONES. Yes.

Mr. KLINE. Or State.

General JONES. It has migrated into—we have seen the power of these small initiatives scattered over five different nations in the trans-Sahara region, specifically Algeria, Chad, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. It is kind of a multiyear strategy aimed at assisting these nations in preventing efforts by terrorist organizations from getting a foothold in their regions and creating sanctuaries in the region called the Pan-Sahel and the Maghreb. So what we are trying to do is institutionalize the regional cooperation along their security forces, and obviously to support the democratic governance and to discredit the terrorist ideology.

To do that, we believe that if we can get the authority to link these nations together on this common issue—the one thing that is really striking in all of these countries is that they are absolutely convinced that they need help in understanding what is going on in their regions. So with the flexibility this legislation gives us, we are able to apply the remedies to the intelligence, to the information sharing, to the capacity building, the training of the armed forces, where it is needed and how it is needed, and will bring about a—I think a tremendous capability that will grow.

It doesn't mean that the U.S. has to get in there and do it for them. This is a program that is helping other nations help themselves. At the end of the day, I think upstream does shift in not only previous relations bilaterally with the United States, but also collectively in the region as they come together to prevent the spread of radical fundamentalism and the current trends of activities going in either ungoverned spaces or misgoverned spaces that they can't control.

Mr. KLINE. I see the time is about to expire, but to make sure I understand, you are doing this, you have got a trans-Saharan view of this, but you are doing this, ambassador by ambassador, country team by country team.

General JONES. Yes.

Mr. KLINE. You are spending defense dollars in this effort, DOD dollars.

General JONES. In the main.

Mr. KLINE. Yes.

Dr. HILLEN. Congressman, I would just also point out we are also spending state dollars. For instance, in some of the participating—I think in all of the participating countries, for most of them we have IMET going, International Military Education Training, which contributes, but is not core, into the counterterrorism program, but certainly a big part of it.

We have foreign military financing with some of them, and we have peacekeeping dollars in these three accounts, but it sort of sums up the problem. We are contributing a set of tools for a world that no longer exists. We are able to play as we can on the fringes of this, but the new tools will be needed to pull it all together and get a completely coherent set of funding streams for something like that initiative.

Mr. KLINE. Ambassador.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Congressman Kline, just two observations. One, if you are confused—

Mr. KLINE. Oh, I am.

Mr. EDELMAN [continuing]. I think you can be forgiven for being confused because the situation is confused in the sense that we do have lots of overlapping and sometimes duplicative authorities in certain areas, and absence of authority in others, because the system has grown by accretion over the years. Some are AID authorities, some fall into Dr. Hillen's domain, and some are ours. So there is some confusion.

The other two observations I would make about this is you have put your finger on another piece of the difficulty, and I speak now from having now been in defense for my second tour, but having spent—now in my 27th year as a foreign service officer. We in the Department of Defense are organized and our combatant commanders are organized to take a regional look at these problems as manifested in this initiative.

The Department of State has been organized and has, in the main, done its business on the basis of maintaining and managing a set of bilateral nation-to-nation relationships. There is a bit of a different focus, and there is a difficulty in bringing to bear, as Dr. Hillen was just saying, the tools that have been developed to deal with that approach to the kind of approach that General Jones and his colleagues at U.S. European Command (EUCOM) have tried to bear on this problem in the trans-Sahel region.

Part of what we are attempting to do is to bring these things together. I think when we are at the point when the 1206 cases that we are working our way through come to you, you will see that we are trying to actually in that authority bridge this gap a little bit. That is a part, I think, of what we are trying to do.

General JONES. If I could just come back to, because I think I want to clarify that answer I gave you. Let me take fiscal year 2005 as an example, which is \$6.8 million. Five million dollars of that came from Title 10 funding, which is DOD. An additional \$1.75 million came from counternarcotics funding, and \$5 million in Title 22 funding was received from the Department of State.

So it comes—it always comes—if you look out in fiscal year 2008 to 2013, you have Title 10 and Title 22 funding requests that will come from both sides of both organizations, both State and DOD.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you very much.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, gentlemen. It is good to welcome General Jones again. I want to thank you for your hospitality last Decem-

ber and a great opportunity to talk about the issues and changes in NATO.

In this new edition of the *National Journal*, Mr. Chairman, there is a great article in here called "The New Face of NATO." We had a number of those discussions, if you recall, that evening that you hosted us.

There are a couple of things I want to read from the article that I think speak to the—maybe if not to the confusion, but to maybe the concerns that we ought to have when we have—as what is quoted in a recent article from the State Department. A gentleman said, in the longer run, we need to have our assistance structured in a way that will give us even broader flexibility.

The President and his advisers must be able to devise a program that can allocate money as needed among whatever agencies have the skill sets to deliver the capabilities, whether it is state, defense, justice, or other government agencies, which, you know, I agree that we are in a new world, and we face new challenges. We have got to have, in some respects, greater flexibility. But in some cases, when we look back historically, and I am thinking about the 1980's, with the Central American issue with the contras and the things that went on there, the restrictions and the limitations are there, I think, for a very good reason.

Before we change those, before we give this flexibility that is being argued for, I think we need to fully understand. This gets back to the comment of my colleague, when he sees there is a lot of confusion.

That—having said that, in this article, General Jones, that is in the *National Journal*, I want to read from it, because I would like to have you comment on the changes that you have seen since you have been there, which have been great. I mean, we had a great discussion that evening and last December. So, let me just read a part of it and bring this issue to the perspective that I would like for us to have your feedback on.

It says, and I will start here, it is quoting you, general, I can tell you, when I arrived at NATO, the only operation really on the agenda was the Balkans, and no one really was even talking about Afghanistan.

Now, three years later, NATO is about to undertake the most ambitious and difficult mission in Afghanistan and at great strategic distance with many challenges. As long as we keep in mind that this is a challenging mission with an element of risk, I think NATO has the political will and the military capability to succeed. Although Afghanistan remains NATO's number one priority at present, a visit to the Strategic Direction Center of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, underscores Jones' points that the alliances and divisions stretch much farther. Video and computer screens in the center provide windows into NATO missions on five continents, including peacekeeping in Kosovo, maritime counterterrorism operations in the Mediterranean, logistical assistance to African Union peacekeepers in Darfur, an officer training program in Iraq, and a recently completed disaster relief effort in Pakistan.

There is a curious divergence in Europe right now, and within NATO itself, General Jones stated. As we have clearly seen over

the last three years, there is a political will for the alliance to do much more, but there is an equal and offsetting political desire to cut defense budgets. At some point, if we don't reconcile those impulses, there is a train wreck out there waiting to happen.

At the same time there is a dramatic change in the mind-set and the culture under way. NATO is truly at a historic crossroads, and I think it is starting to choose the right path. If the alliance can accomplish everything that is now on its agenda, it will be a defining moment and a tremendous relief for the United States as NATO comes on line as an even stronger partner.

So, having, you know, five minutes is never long enough.

Having read from that, General, let me just tell you, I support and I applaud the changes, because I think a lot of it has to do with your leadership and your ability to convince NATO to come around to these priorities.

But the concern I have, given your statement about the issue of the political will for the alliance to do much more, about an equal and offsetting and political desire to cut defense budgets, and the train wreck that you cite—we are seeing some of that now here on Capitol Hill when we are looking at the cost of Army transformation, the cost of new weapons systems, the way procurement systems are running and that kind of thing with the far side of the deficits that are mounting.

So, with the agenda that NATO is—has on its plate at this point, that is a real concern and should be a real concern for us that there may be in there some expectation that we are going to pick up some of that tab.

When they want to expand the ability to help us because of the changing world and because of the new challenges that we face, and we are seeing everybody coming in here and quoted as wanting more flexibility, the concern I would have is who is going to pick up the tab? We certainly don't have the deep pockets that we had when we were projecting surpluses five years ago. Now we are in record deficit, in a record deficit situation.

So I would like—can you comment on that, and, in particular, what is your sense about their political will versus the reality of having to pay for some of these aggressive agendas?

General JONES. Thank you, sir. Thank you for your kind words.

I will try to be very brief. This is a dual problem. On the one hand, at NATO you do have this enormous political will to do more, 30,000 troops deployed on several continents, some very important missions. This is a critical time for NATO. I think NATO is at a strategic crossroads, and I believe that it will take the right path, notwithstanding the fact that we do have some financial problems in getting nations to adhere to the two percent of GDP that was the minimum agreed to in 2002.

Having said that, I think nations realize it, they understand it. I am hopeful that they will understand that you can't, on the one hand, continue to expand your missions and, on the other hand, continue to contract your budgets.

I think there is also a question inside of NATO, that the secretary general is currently leading, to reform the way in which we do manage the budgets that we do have, how we spend our money,

where does it go, and are we, in fact, doing the right thing. That is another aspect of transformation.

But the good news for the United States is there is this momentum in the right direction. We should not only support it, but I think we should continue to be actively leading it.

As you know, the percentage that the United States contributes to NATO is roughly about 27 percent of the budget and the manpower that is the generally accepted contribution level, and that is not changing one way or another. So what we need to do is hold what we have, I think, and encourage others to step up.

The second part of my answer is the bilateral relationships. Now, I will put my—the unified commander hat on as the U.S. commander of forces in Europe and in Africa, and this is what this legislation gets us to, an increased flexibility. I think we should work as my colleagues here at the witness table have said. I think we should work toward greater clarity in terms of how we do these things.

But there is no doubt in my mind that if we could get to where we could be more agile and more responsive to what is going on in the world, and we can better succeed against the competition we have—and we do have competition out there for the first time, we have serious economic competitors and serious security competitors.

We noticed that some countries are buying their weapons in great quantities from Russia, for example, very easy to deal with. China is routinely inviting young Africans back to China for scholarships and universities for military training. They make things very attractive for the business end of things and how you engage.

We need more flexibility. I am convinced of it. I think we are going to need it more in the future. I think we have to find ways in which my successors, combatant commanders, unified commanders, have the responsibility that they need. I think that is clear, those lines are clear. But they need more flexibility in terms of the resources that they can bring to bear at the right time, at the right place.

There is a time element in this, because we cannot simply continue, I think, being seen as a Nation that is to be admired and emulated, but too hard to work with because of our interlocking bands of conflicting, sometimes offsetting authorities. I just they think we need to bring greater clarity and precision to how we do things so that we can be successful.

This is really an aspect of transformation that I want to spend just a little moment on, just to say what we are doing with the U.S. Armed Forces, and what NATO is doing, I think, is we are building a force capability that is no longer dependent on mass, big armies, huge numbers deployed all over the world, but focused strategic effects with smaller groups, more focus, more capability, and empowered to bring about change, but not to do it for people, but to do it so that they can help themselves.

At some point we will be able to pull back, and we will be able to say, job well done. We have greater security. They have greater pride in what they are doing, because they are part of the solution, part of the problem and part of the solution. I think that is really the nature of the 21st century, as opposed to the 20th century,

where we would bring in all of the capabilities and the incredible amounts of people and massed effort.

It is a different world, but the footprint of the U.S. European Command, for example, is going to be dramatically reduced in terms of numbers. It is going to be a lot less expensive to maintain troops overseas. But what those troops are going to do in their transformed state, that strategic difference is going to be much more—deliver much more capabilities and security and stability through the proper application of these, I think, relatively modest amounts of money that will yield tremendous strategic return.

I use—I come back to Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, but there are other parts of my 91-country area of responsibility (AOR) where we are doing things very inexpensively, but with great return on investment.

Mr. REYES. But if I can just follow briefly, Mr. Chairman, but there is no illusion that we are going to be able to pick up the tab.

General JONES. Not in NATO. In NATO the effort is to make others rise, you know, increase their levels of spending. Our level of support to NATO is generally fixed. The question on the bilateral side, the national side, is do we want—in our bilateral relations, do we want to do the kinds of things we are proposing. My suggestion is that we do this.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I have two quick questions, and then I will react to something that the ambassador said, and then you can think about the questions.

First off, we have got—how to distinguish between the types of programs or projects or spending that you are going to do under 1206 versus what you are already doing under the IMET, or whatever it is. Mr. Ambassador, you make a comment about a reserve fund for contingencies, think about how you are going to manage that and avoid the bureaucratic desire to spend every dollar at the end of the budget year, that kind of thing.

There is a line in a country song that talks about, you can tell by my outfit that I am a cowboy. Well, you can tell by where I sit how long I have been here. I am still startled by the way we throw numbers around.

When I think about spending, I think about a fellow working morning tour on a drilling rig in west Texas, or I think about my six grandkids who we will borrow from. One would take away from him and his family. The other would take away from the future of our collective grandkids.

What I heard you say was we got a brand new program, we haven't spent the first dollar yet, we are way—we are still in the process of trying to figure out what it is and who it is are going to spend it. We have got a reasonably good dialogue going on between state and the DOD. We have not yet gone to the President yet, that is \$200 million in the bank, and given how—I need another 7—I need another \$550 million, because we have collectively figured out that. So when you say given enough time I can execute and spend this \$750 million, it doesn't give me a lot of warm

fuzzies. I have sat in your chair with the state legislature running an agency. Be sensitive to where that money comes from.

I know you were talking at 10,000 feet, and I am probably talking at a foot and a half, but this is money some fellow in west Texas is working right now to pay, or my grandkids will have to pay the interest on the debt anyway, at least when they are taxpayers.

That is my little diatribe. You can react to that and also answer the question about how do we distinguish this from what we are already doing?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Congressman Conaway, first of all, I agree with you that our objective ought to be to spend the taxpayers' dollar as smartly as we can.

I think part of the effort here is that, as General Jones just said, if we can spend some relatively speaking modest amounts of money wisely, we may save ourselves other kinds of costs later on. If we can have more people available for peacekeeping missions, we can avoid being necessarily dragged into or deploying our own folks in these kinds of missions. It costs less to field these other folks than it does our folks.

Mr. CONAWAY. Yes. I am not arguing about the concept; I agree totally with the whole idea how do we make sure we are getting the right bang for the buck.

Ambassador EDELMAN. To the point about coming back, we initially asked for \$750 million. We got \$200 million. By the time we had got the authority, we were already well into the fiscal year. So there has been a time constraint under which we are working, and we have had to work through some of the other requirements that were levied on us in the legislation.

That is one reason why we are seeking relief from them, because as we have worked through some of this, it adds more time to the process. What I was trying to say was if we have a clear amount of money against which we can plan and know what we are going to have to work with, we will be able to execute that, because we have that number of potential projects that the combatant commanders have identified for us like the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative that General Jones runs, et cetera.

That was my only point. It was not that, you know, give me the money—you know, if you build it, they will come. That wasn't the idea at all.

On the question of FMF versus what we do with 1206 or IMET, I will defer to Dr. Hillen a little bit, because FMF IMET is his program. But, again, I think the issue here is between those things that are relatively predictable and deliberate and can be planned for in the long budget cycle, if you will, those things that come up as opportunities, or challenges that we need to meet in a relatively shorter period of time, and trying to focus these special authorities that you all have given us in this period on the latter, rather than the more predictable military education and training, ongoing relationship-tending that we normally engage in.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, looking at it on our side in terms of oversight, and given that we go on a budget-year-to-budget-year kind of concept, how do we manage that? How do we not allow that to become a slush fund; we still get the same scrutiny and hard deci-

sions that are made, that if you have got \$750 million in demand, and you only have \$500 million, you will do a better job of spending that \$500 million, perhaps, because you really hone in on—how do we on this side of the table get comfort that you are spending the money the way—

Ambassador EDELMAN. I would spend it—

Mr. CONAWAY. That is a horrible way to say it.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, it is, first of all, a function of fact that we are having this hearing today. I am sure we will have more in the future, and we will come up and be able to answer questions. I hope we will be in a better position to answer specifics, because we will have gotten past—either gotten these things approved by the President or be operating in an environment where if the secretaries of state and defense can agree, that will be sufficient.

I do think—this goes a little bit to Congressman Reyes' point as well—worried about what is the check on irresponsibility if you have greater flexibility? It is a fair question. I do think when you have a process that involves both the secretary of defense and the secretary of state certifying it, and you require that not only the combatant commanders, but the civilians in OSD as well as our colleagues at State, to work through this process and then report it to you and the members, and the staff, professional staff here as we go forward. You know, we undoubtedly will get feedback from you and other members about what you think, based on your travels and your experiences. That will obviously become a part of the process as this goes forward.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SCHWARZ [presiding]. I think I am up as well. I would like to just ask, without specificity, only within certain geographic areas, we have historically had a very close relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and they have used a great deal of United States military equipment. We have based people in the Kingdom, but we now have very close relationships as well with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Council countries, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, Bahrain, Qatar.

What is our attitude now in regard to the Saudis as opposed to these other entities in the gulf since the Saudis are now, I think, purchasing a Eurofighter?

Their relationship with us may not be quite as close as it was before. We have negotiated free trade agreements with Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). What kind of cooperation are we getting? What is the attitude of the countries in the gulf, and what, in general, without specificity, are our intentions in dealing with those countries in the gulf which are not Saudi Arabia in the fact that they are buying equipment, obviously, from other countries?

You mention that lots of people are on the markets, especially the Russians, which I have been led to believe that Russia is the largest arms dealer in the world. Can you give me an idea about, in general, in a nonclassified situation? I know we are going to go into a classified meeting in a bit, but what is our attitude toward the countries in the gulf vis-à-vis military assistance, mil-mil especially?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Dr. Hillen, of course, manages this from the State Department point of view, from the point of view of for-

eign military sales and foreign military funding parts of this. It is administered, of course, by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in the Department of Defense.

I think the countries in the gulf and the kingdom continue to be important partners for us in the Global War on Terror, and, in particular, the kingdom has been fighting at home with increasing effect the terrorist threat they face. There have been some stresses and strains over time, but we have had, I think, some good exchanges of late.

The Chairman, General Pace, was in the kingdom recently. We are engaged in some other efforts with them, as well as the states that make up, for instance, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and I expect that those will go forward. I think that we will continue to be in a working relationship with them in a variety of different areas, and the security challenges they face are multivariant. Part of them are from the Global War on Terror, and others are some regional developments. I think both of those efforts will incline us to be working together more closely.

Dr. HILLEN. Mr. Chairman, on a couple of points, from a security assistance perspective point, of course, we don't provide any security assistance to the region because they are very wealthy. They are very wealthy countries. However, we do aid them and are their principal partner of all the GCC countries in the mil relationship.

In the Saudi Arabia relationship in particular, I don't think it is a huge security concern for a couple of reasons. Some of the recent acquisition decisions, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has in general over its history maintained several acquisition tracts. You can largely characterize them as a European-based one and an American-based one. So when they replaced Typhoons and Eurofighters, I think it is seen in that stream, where we would be concerned is if they replaced F-16s with Rafiels or something along those lines.

But they, of course, have a very close relationship with us and then us to maintain access and influence. They know we have the best military in the world, and they want to continue to have a relationship in weapons platforms to training to things we do in IMET with the best military in the world.

On your macro question, I recently came back from the region. I recently talked with the ministers with the four GCC countries. I talked in concert with Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense, another message of how we are trying to do these things together as one national security team.

We went to talk with them about Iraq for the first part, and they wanted to talk about Iran, Iran and the threat of a potentially nuclear Iran. An expansionist Iran is driving the GCC countries and the others in the region together. I think we have an opportunity in front of us to reframe gulf security, understand their security concerns, and work with them and even form closer and more productive and integrated defense relationships in the region. We will work through that over time.

We feel, from the policy-planning perspective, in terms of foreign policy at the State Department, we are pretty positive about our relationships in the region, but also realize that they need to continue to change, keep up with the new dynamics, the new Iraq, where Iran is and the other changes in the region.

Dr. SCHWARZ. So it would not be an unfair or inaccurate statement to say that we would like to look at our allies in the gulf, especially in the GCC countries and in Saudi Arabia because of the Wahabi movement and Salafists coming out of Saudi Arabia, that they do—and we can expect them and we hope that they act as a counterweight to Iran. That would not be an inaccurate statement, would it?

Dr. HILLEN. I do not think that would be inaccurate, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SCHWARZ. General Jones, any comment on that?

General JONES. No, thank you, sir.

Dr. SCHWARZ. The Chairman has indicated—I think we are—Bill, I am sorry. Mr. Shuster. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much.

First of all, I am not clear, I think I know where we are spending this money, but just to be clear, we are not spending it on our wealthier allies—Doc, I think you said, Saudis; we don't give the Saudis any money.

Dr. HILLEN. They get a small amount of money to stay in the IMET program, just to participate, it is a couple thousand dollars. But, no, we use security assistance for countries that can't otherwise afford it to build up their capacities.

Mr. SHUSTER. Europeans, they don't receive any of this money there?

Dr. HILLEN. The money for the most part goes to countries in Eastern Europe; the Balkans and elsewhere also receive some security assistance.

Mr. SHUSTER. Okay. Along the same line of questioning that Mr. Reyes was on, I have great concern about—we don't have the unlimited resources to spend and continue to spend. I think it is imperative that our allies, especially NATO allies, step up to the plate.

General, you talked of them in broad, general terms. I think as Members of Congress we should know which of our allies are really pushing our envelope, or out there leading, or spending more money, or have been very cooperative with us. I wonder if you might talk about those in NATO or around the world that are doing just that, are being very helpful and supportive in this effort.

General JONES. Thank you. The numbers in NATO, for example, in terms of that two percent of GDP standard that I mentioned, while not encouraging, basically only seven countries in the alliance are spending two percent or more of their GDP on security, so we have quite a ways to go.

Mr. SHUSTER. Who are they?

General JONES. I think it is the U.K., France, Italy, the U.S.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Turkey.

General JONES. Turkey. Very good.

Mr. SHUSTER. The Dutch?

General JONES. I have the list, I just don't have it with me. I will share it if you would like to see it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 65.]

Mr. SHUSTER. I was in the Netherlands in December and I think maybe, Ambassador, I was there on the heels—when you and Sec-

retary Feith were over there trying to convince the Dutch to take over security in Kandahar. But I was very impressed with General Berline, and, at least from the military standpoint, their willingness. We met with members of Parliament and those who were like-minded that wanted to do more, and they had a tough political situation.

Can you comment? I think I got the report the Dutch did agree to put 1,400 troops into Kandahar.

Ambassador EDELMAN. That was my colleague, my two colleagues Peter Flory and Ambassador Freid who went together, and General Jones may want to comment about this more because it is really specifically something he has been working; but, yes, the Dutch have agreed to deploy as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) NATO stage three in the south.

General JONES. Actually, the aftermath of the entire process, while a little painful to go through, turned out to be an overwhelming affirmation on the part of the Dutch Parliament to support the mission. So it really, at the end, had a very good effect on not only the commitments of the Dutch forces but it also reassured some of the neighboring countries that we are all going forward together so it is a positive outcome.

Mr. SHUSTER. It would seem to me also for our allies, the wealthier allies, if we are using commonality in equipment—I know the joint strike fighter, weapons systems, smaller weapons systems—that would seem to me to help in the effort to train the Jordanians and the Afghanis if everybody is using similar weapons. Is that something we are moving forward with and pressuring or encouraging our European allies and other wealthier allies to try figure out how we can use similar weapons systems?

Dr. HILLEN. I can talk about this in the context of the coalition. One of the great things that NATO has proven to be a bedrock for is we have got these 63 countries in the coalition on the Global War on Terror. And you may have traveled down to MacDill Air Force Base; they were actually going to move them from the trailers into a building. This is an enduring feature of the strategic landscape that we will fight with, with the number of countries who are of like mind. And one of the great things with that broad coalition is NATO's bedrock and framework of all our alliance and coalition structures and, over the course of time, evolved political and operational and acquisition commonalities ranging from standardization agreements (STANAG) to standard operating procedures (SOP) to other things that we want to layer onto the coalition of the willing.

We have seen other wealthy countries like Japan, Australia, Korea, that are acting in a way along the lines of what you were thinking, and they are contributing heavily. And on some programs I think we need to go back to our allies across the globe and say there is even another level you can rise to, because we are—the United States provides a disproportionate share of the common good of security around the world, from which everybody benefits. And that is an argument we make constantly in every quarter and it is an argument that is usually well received, but we always need to continue to need to make it because there is a lot of security task out there in the world.

General JONES. Our interoperability is absolutely essential in the alliance and we worked very hard on that and we have an entire command. My colleague, General Smith, the commander of allied command transformation, that is really the *raison d'être* of the command, is to harmonize the divergent capabilities that we have.

In NATO I would say that the maritime forces are the most interoperable, followed by the air forces, and followed by the land forces; and the land forces is where the bulk of the work has yet to be done. But it is amazing to see the maritime forces of the nations operating together. They have done this now for over 20 years and it is really a beautiful thing to watch. We are hopeful that in time the land forces will reach that same degree of interoperability.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you for being here today and I appreciate your comments.

General JONES. I might add, if I may, that the NATO response force, which is destined to reach full operational capability on 1 October of this year, is probably the quintessential example of interoperability and combined arms coming together, and that is a first for NATO. But when it comes into its maturity I think you will see a tremendous help there for the United States and a lot of its missions.

Mr. SHUSTER. How big is that force?

General JONES. Twenty-five thousand soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and special ops in each 6-month rotation.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much.

Dr. SCHWARZ. The gentlelady from California had a quick comment to make, I believe, before we go into closed session.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. This has been an excellent hearing and I think what it brings to mind is our discussions of interagency collaboration. And we kept asking what can we as Congress do, and I think breaking down those silos we have here is also one of those, because I think there are some real serious implications for congressional oversight.

We have enough difficulty, as you know, Mr. Chairman, following the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) issues, and when we deal with these complex and vital issues, we need more time to do that. We certainly need a new level of expertise to do it as well. So I appreciate that and I hope that we will continue to do that in the future.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Does the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Missouri, have any comments?

Mr. SKELTON. No, except to thank our witnesses for being with us today.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you, sir.

Gentlemen, thank you very much. We are going to adjourn for five minutes and then we will go into a closed session.

[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the committee recessed, to continue in Executive Session.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 7, 2006

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 7, 2006

**Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee on Train and
Equip Authority**

**The Honorable Eric Edelman
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
April 7, 2006**

America faces adaptive enemies. We must also be adaptive and seize emerging opportunities in the Global War on Terrorism. One such opportunity is the building of the capacity of partner nations to fight the Global War on Terrorism: Although the United States possesses the finest military force in the world, this war will not be won without the help of partner nations.

The recently released National Security Strategy calls for a transformation of America's national security institutions and for strengthened alliances to defeat global terrorism and to prevent attacks against the U.S. and our friends. The National Security Strategy further states that effective international cooperation is dependent on capable partners.

The recent Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, points out that the ability of the United States to work with capable partners to influence the global

environment is fundamental to defeating terrorist networks. Wherever possible, the United States must enable allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity and developing mechanisms to share the risks and responsibilities of today's complex challenges. The QDR recommends that the United States continue to work with its allies to develop approaches, consistent with their domestic laws and applicable international law, to disrupt and defeat transnational threats before they mature.

The U.S. strategy in the Global War on Terrorism has three key elements:

1. Protecting the homeland.
2. Disrupting and attacking terrorist networks.
3. Countering ideological support for terrorism.

Building partner nation capabilities contributes to all three elements, and is the Global War on Terrorism's counterpart to FDR's "Arsenal of Democracy." During World War II, the United States shipped large amounts of supplies to allies such as England and Russia, taking advantage of the fact that these allies were often far better positioned to fight the Axis enemy. These supplies ensured that the Allies maintained the means and

morale to stay in the fight, and helped to reduce the number of U.S. casualties.

Today, enabling our partners to share the burden of the Global War on Terrorism produces many of the same results. Sending our troops into harm's way without competent partner military and security forces significantly increases the risks they face. The existence of capable, competent partners reduces stress on our military, as many Global War on Terrorism tasks are best accomplished by and with partner nations who know the local geography, language, and culture. For example, the Secretary of Defense recently stated: "It costs approximately \$90,000 per year to sustain a U.S. service member in theater, as opposed to about \$11,000 to sustain an Afghan soldier, or \$40,000 for an Iraqi soldier."

Additionally, helping our partners gain security capabilities helps us reduce ungoverned areas, thereby depriving terrorist organizations of potential safe havens, and allowing our partners to secure their national borders, restore legitimate authority, and establish the rule of law.

It is clear that building partnership capacity is essential. However, the train and equip authorities created during the Cold War are ill-suited to the adaptive, asymmetric, non-state threats we face today. They cannot be relied upon to help us defeat the forces of global terrorism. We need new, more responsive authorities enabling us to expedite the training and equipping of partner nations.

For instance, in October 2001, the President announced support for training Georgian forces to close terrorist safe havens along its borders. Because we were using outdated, Cold War-era authorities, the U.S. Government struggled to meet this pledge, cobbling together funds from seven different U.S. sources and two different agencies, and employing allied contributions, as well. It took seven months to begin staff-level training, and tactical training did not begin until September 2002. Training four battalions took two and a half years – until May 2004.

However, once trained and equipped, the Georgian forces made significant contributions to the Global War on Terrorism. These troops took on terrorist networks in the Pankisi Gorge that we had a common interest in disrupting. Then, as an unanticipated benefit, many of these forces redeployed to Iraq.

Today, Georgia has roughly 850 soldiers deployed to Iraq in support of Coalition operations, which makes it the highest per capita contributor among our Coalition partners in Operation Iraqi Freedom. We need authorities to help us build the capacity of partners like Georgia in a more effective, timely manner.

The sections 1206 building partnership capacity (global train and equip) authority granted in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 was a good start, and reflects vision on the part of Congress. It allows DoD and State to work together and to leverage the core competencies of each. We're in the early stages of 1206 implementation, and the two Departments are working together in an unprecedented way.

While section 1206 was a start, it needs improvement. In general, some of the key challenges with the 1206 authority are the following:

- The legislation is limited to national military forces, when in actuality a variety of security forces (gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, border security, etc.) and military forces are on the front lines

in the Global War On Terrorism. We must expand the authority to include these forces.

- The authority must draw on “defense-wide” operation and maintenance funds, a fraction of overall DoD operations and maintenance funds, severely limiting our ability to use the authority. The authority needs to allow for all available DoD operations and maintenance funds.
- The authority is bound by numerous foreign assistance restrictions, and includes no waiver option for critical national security issues. We need a waiver – to be exercised by the President or the Secretary of State as appropriate – in order to build critical partnership capacity and use the authority in the way it was intended.
- The amount of the authority is \$200 million. We need to increase this amount to \$750 million to meet the needs of our embassies and Combatant Commands. We need to strengthen current preventive activities and also have some amount in reserve should a major contingency arise.

- The current language speaks about joint State-DoD formulation and implementation of programs – and the two Departments are in fact doing this in practice. We are working with State to develop mutually agreeable proposals aimed at states in South East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. However, the current authority requires Presidential certification for each specific country which is a time consuming process we are still undergoing, thus detracting from our ability to rapidly use this authority as it was intended. We would prefer a formulation that places the authority at the Secretary level and which makes the Secretary of State’s concurrence explicit.

The Departments of State and Defense have developed changes to the 1206 authority addressing these challenges. The Office of Management and Budget has cleared the proposal for transmittal and the Department of Defense submitted it to Congress for consideration.

Section 1206 requires a review of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and other similar provisions to determine to what extent these laws interfere with our ability to build partnership capacity in a post-

9/11 environment. We welcome the opportunity to provide you this report, which is due in January 2007.

However, renovating our foreign assistance system will be an enormous, lengthy task; we need to make the necessary changes to the section 1206 authority now. If we cannot use this authority in the way intended by the Secretaries of State and Defense, then our ability to enlist partners to assist in the Global War on Terrorism will be greatly diminished, as will our ability to reduce the stress on our forces and the danger to our servicemen and women.

The section 1206 authority is an excellent vehicle for enhancing State-DoD cooperation in both counterterrorism and stability operations. Building partnership security capacity is both a Title 10 *and* a Title 22 task, and this authority provides the right mechanism for unity of effort between the Defense and State Departments. Components from both Departments are displaying unprecedented cooperation in developing and shaping proposals.

The strategic environment has changed significantly. Throughout most of the 20th century, our primary threats came from strong, aggressive nation

states. In the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, fragile states were viewed primarily as a humanitarian issue. However, we now recognize fragile states and ungoverned areas as potential breeding grounds for terrorism and safe havens for global terrorist organizations. 1206 authority helps us address this reality by leveraging and coordinating the strengths of the Departments of State and Defense to build partnership capacity, win the Global War on Terrorism, and protect the lives of our active duty, reserve, and National Guard servicemen and women.

I thank you for the opportunity to speak about this critical legislation, and I now welcome your questions.

**Testimony to the
House Armed Services Committee**

**“Security Assistance as a Tool for
Building Capacity”**

**The Honorable Dr. John Hillen
Assistant Secretary of State
Political Military Affairs**

**April 7, 2006
10:00 – 12:00**

Good morning Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the State Department's role in building the capacity of the military forces of our allied and partner nations.

Security assistance is a critical foreign policy tool that allows the United States to advance its national security interests worldwide from continuing rewarding partnerships with our allies to broader goals of promoting key American values with respect to democracy, human rights, and civilian rule of the military. In addition, security assistance also increases the capacity of our military forces by providing the necessary funding and training to our coalition partners and friendly nations so that they can work towards common security goals and share burdens in joint missions. The State Department, and specifically my bureau Political-Military Affairs, has the policy lead on developing and implementing security assistance. The accounts we manage are Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) accounts.

In addition to these three traditional capacity building programs, the State Department welcomes the opportunity to work closely with our Defense Department colleagues in formulating plans for using the “1206” train and equip authority. The State Department continues to support new DoD authorities, such as 1206 and 1207, because these authorities augment the tools available to both Secretaries to act quickly when unforeseen events or new opportunities make the initiation or expansion of a training, equipping or advisory program necessary. In the case of supporting select DoD authorities, the Administration is seeking to maximize the use of complementary resources and capabilities of the various agencies, in ways that will best serve the Administration’s overall goals of providing comprehensive, integrated assistance. These authorities received a joint endorsement from the Secretaries of State and Defense and are exactly the kind of flexible tools we need to win the long war. We hope that Congress will continue to lend its support to these and other flexible authorities requested by the administration. I have been personally involved in the joint formulation and approval of plans for using 1206 in FY 2006. State and DoD coordination throughout this process has been excellent and we look forward to briefing this committee soon with our final proposals.

FMF

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is the cornerstone of security assistance. FMF provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training, which promotes U.S. national security by contributing to regional and global stability, strengthening military support for democratically-elected governments, and containing transnational threats including terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons. These grants enable key allies and friends to improve their defense capabilities and foster closer military relationships between the U.S. and recipient nations. Increased military capabilities build and strengthen multilateral coalitions with the U.S. and enable friends and allies to be increasingly interoperable with regional, U.S., and NATO forces. By increasing demand for U.S. systems, FMF also contributes to a strong U.S. defense industrial base, an important element of U.S. national defense strategy that reduces cost for Department of Defense acquisitions.

FMF has proven a vital tool in preparing our coalition partners to participate effectively in U.S.-led operations such as in Iraq and

Afghanistan. The FMF funds we are using in FY06 and requesting in FY07 are critical to burden-sharing in these operations.

IMET

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a key component of the U.S. security assistance program. IMET provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. In addition to improving defense capabilities, IMET's traditional purpose of promoting more professional militaries around the world through training has taken on greater importance as an effective means to strengthen military alliances and the international coalition against terrorism. Military cooperation between the U.S. and coalition partners and friendly governments is strengthened as foreign militaries improve their knowledge of U.S. military doctrine, strategic planning processes and operational procedures. This cooperation leads to opportunities for military-to-military interaction, information sharing, joint planning and combined force exercises that facilitate interoperability with U.S., NATO, and regional coalition forces.

IMET funding has been very important in preparing coalition forces and friendly nations to participate in peace-keeping operations and joint missions world-wide. The benefits of IMET training with countries working closely in the war on terrorism already have been evident, reflected in smooth collaboration with a growing number of countries.

PKO

The third account, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), supports multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations that are not funded through the UN (assessed) mechanism. This funding helps to support regional peace support operations for which international coalitions or neighboring countries take primary responsibility. These funds also help build capabilities in countries seeking to participate in international peace support missions. PKO enables the United States to better assist countries in transition to create an environment of security and stability essential to their social, economic, and political progress. The United States is committed to enhancing the ability of other nations and international organizations to carry out voluntary peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, thereby sharing an international burden to restore regional stability and peace.

An important part of our PKO program is the Global Peace Operations Initiative. The GPOI is a Presidential initiative to increase the capacity of other countries to deploy to international peace support operations. It is a five-year program that focuses on addressing key gaps in global peacekeeping capacity by 1) training 75,000 peace support troops worldwide, with an emphasis in the Africa region and building African command headquarters capability; 2) increasing the number of gendarme units deployable to international operations; and 3) facilitating deployment by helping to provide equipment, transportation, and field sustainment.

Thank you for allowing me to testify before you this morning about the important role the State Department plays in building our military's capacity through our security assistance programs.

55

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**STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC
COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

ON

APRIL 7, 2006

A Commander's Perspective

on

Building the Capacity of Foreign Countries Military Forces

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Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the potential benefits of implementing Section 1206 to build the capacity of foreign countries national military forces in the United States European Command (EUCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). The authority provided under this provision will enable countries to conduct counterterrorist operations, and participate in, or provide support to military and stability operations in which the United States Armed Forces are a participant.

I would like to begin by placing the funding and authorities authorized under Section 1206 within the larger context of security cooperation within the EUCOM AOR. When I testified before this committee last month, I stated that we based our strategies on the principle that it is much more cost-effective to prevent conflicts than it is to stop one once it's started. I cannot overstate the importance of our theater security cooperation programs as the centerpiece to securing our Homeland from the irregular and catastrophic threats of the 21st Century. EUCOM's programs represent a proactive approach to building partnership capacity with the intent of enabling emerging democracies to defend their homeland, defeat terrorist extremists, develop common economic and security interests, and respond to health crises such as potential pandemic influenza outbreaks.

The changing security landscape that has emerged since the end of the Cold War continues to evolve in ways that were largely unforeseen just a few years ago. An increasingly inter-connected world is shaping our economic, political, and social realities in a manner that is in stark contrast to the previous century. The wide scope and unpredictable nature of this new landscape has compelled us to develop new strategies that require the harmonization of the full spectrum of

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national power. Although the threats we face have changed dramatically, resources available for security cooperation, one of our key enablers in dealing with present day challenges, are still used as they have been since the Cold War. They are applied for deliberative, long-lead-time system built to address a single, enduring and predictable enemy.

Today, we require the capability to respond to threats wherever and whenever they materialize in the world. Our ability to achieve optimum success in this new security environment requires three essential elements: timely intervention to unanticipated challenges that will help mitigate or prevent crises that are harmful to U.S. interests; the need to work closely with our friends and allies to enhance regional security; and institutional innovations that contribute to comprehensive coordination throughout the interagency and within the framework of the international community. The new 1206 authority goes beyond simply reallocating funding by explicitly requiring US government agencies to work together to develop and execute programs—that is a paradigm shift and it will be a critical first step in security cooperation reform. The authority provided in Section 1206 is an important tool in our efforts to implement a strategy that recognizes the changed security landscape.

Traditionally, our armed forces have focused on fighting and winning wars. While we need to be prepared to operate across the full spectrum of conflict, the new security landscape demonstrates that early engagement, often requiring modest investment, can yield significant long-term dividends. EUCOM and other Geographic Combatant Commanders are using a new approach, focusing on terrorism's long-term, underlying conditions. This deliberate strategy, which focuses on addressing threats *at their inception*, once they have been identified, is

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come to be called “Phase Zero.” The primary objectives are eliminating conditions favorable to terrorists and mitigating or preventing broader conflict. A critical component in fighting the global war on terrorism is putting together programs that build the capacity of foreign nations to conduct counter-terrorists operations and participate in or provide support to military and stability operations in which the U.S. is a participant.

EUCOM’s plan to promote cooperative security relationships, enhance the capacity of foreign partners, and expand cohesion within the interagency team is consistent with the four core pillars (Defeating Terrorist Networks, Defending the Homeland In-Depth, Shaping the Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads, Preventing the Acquisition or Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Hostile State or Non-State Actors) of the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review. Leveraging the full spectrum of diplomatic, economic, and military options to advance our national interests and improve our ability to prevent conflict is an essential cornerstone to our theater strategy.

Our Security Cooperation activities are managed programs planned and executed for the purpose of shaping the future security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. Key among EUCOM’s TSC tools are Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, and International Military Education and Training. These programs provide access and influence, help build professional, capable militaries in allied and friendly nations, and promote interoperability with U.S. forces. We execute the larger security assistance programs using our 44 Offices of Defense Cooperation in concert with U.S. Embassy Country Teams, while smaller programs are executed by Defense Attachés and Embassy Offices.

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I would like to highlight two European Command initiatives that would greatly benefit from the addition of 1206 authorities and funding, provided they are approved – the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Initiative and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative. These programs illustrate EUCOM’s efforts to help harmonize US government agencies in regional, preventive approaches to combat terrorism and build partner nation capability to secure ungoverned land and maritime spaces, increase counterterrorism capability, and improve the conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.

The lack of basic maritime awareness throughout large portions of EUCOM’s AOR (and, to varying degrees, the rest of the world) creates an ungoverned maritime environment in which terrorists and criminals can freely move and operate. This is especially apparent in the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea’s potential for great wealth is in stark contrast to the challenges of civil unrest, economic privation, political instability, and corruption. Piracy and theft are major concerns along a coastal area stretching nearly 2,000 nautical miles. Shipping ports, transit areas, harbors, oil production, and transshipment areas are largely uncontrolled and raise concerns about vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Corruption and complicity in local, regional, and national governments only serve to exacerbate this problem. In short, the region lacks significant maritime forces and coastal security forces, and is unable to provide a meaningful deterrent to the disorder that threatens the region’s stability and future economic viability.

Developing African capacity and capability to provide maritime security in Africa is only a small part of the equation. Other issues such as poor governance, lack of legal infrastructure and rule of law, and rampant and pervasive corruption

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must also be addressed in a parallel effort. If they are not, any solution focused on improving maritime security will be temporary and will surely fail over the long-term. EUCOM recognizes the importance of addressing this issue from both an interagency and a global perspective. Interagency and international cooperation are essential elements of the proposed EUCOM maritime security strategy for Africa.

Operationally, any Gulf of Guinea strategy must include a number of components. "Detection" and tracking of regional shipping would require an integrated maritime surveillance system; "deciding" whether a particular vessel is legally operated or a smuggler will require the development of a regional maritime command and control center; and "acting" to counter to potential illegal activities. These three components would naturally be linked by a command and control system to allow quick interaction within the system and among national military leaders. With such a system, we can enable these Gulf of Guinea nations to provide security in their combined 2,000 nautical miles of coastline and the littorals, and contribute to the stability they need to make further economic and political progress. Despite a growing willingness to cooperate in the development of a shared maritime awareness, many of our coalition partners have inadequate national and regional capabilities to monitor maritime surface traffic in a manner that enables maritime security operations.

One program that demonstrates the ability of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and USAID to work in a collaborative way on regional security is the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). TSCTI is the long-term interagency plan to combat terrorism in trans-Saharan Africa using a full range of political, economic, development and security tools. It was approved as

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5

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an Interagency Initiative by the Deputies Committee in January 2005. The need for TSCTI stems from concern over the expansion of operations of Islamic terrorist organizations in the Sahel region, a region that approximates the size of the United States. In EUCOM we support TSCTI through our involvement in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-TRANS SAHARA, commonly referred to as "OEF-TS." OEF-TS is an interagency regional and preventive approach to combat terrorism and enhancing partner nation border security and response in Trans-Sahara Africa. It is designed to assist governments who seek to better control their territories and to prevent large areas from becoming safe havens for terrorist groups.

The overall approach is straightforward: to build indigenous capacity and facilitate cooperation among governments in the region. The participating nations, Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia have joined in the struggle against terrorism in the Sahel region. This cooperation strengthens regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhances and institutionalizes cooperation among the region's security forces, promotes democratic governance, fosters development and education, emphasizes the military's proper role in supporting democratic ideals and ultimately strengthens our bilateral relationships in the region. It also assists participating nations in stemming the illegal flow of arms, goods, and people through the region, helps nations better protect their vast borders, and contributes to common security.

Left unattended political instability in Africa could require reactive and repeated interventions at enormous cost, as in the case of Liberia. For a relatively small investment, TSCTI has the potential to produce significant results in countering terrorism. It builds the capacity of partner nations to effectively share information to disrupt and attack terrorist networks, as well as to receive, store and

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act on strategic and operation information to conduct peace and stability operations.

EUCOM has transformed its security cooperation programs to focus on regional capacity building, assisting allies and partner countries with the development of capabilities required to conduct peacekeeping, participate in the War on Terror and perform contingency operations with US forces. Properly implemented within a synchronized, flexible Interagency campaign, these security cooperation efforts can help produce well trained, and highly disciplined allied and partner forces that will reduce the conditions that lead to conflict, prepare the way for warfighting success, and ultimately ease the burden on US forces. Section 1206 funding and authorities are important steps toward creating the kind of flexible, responsive, interagency programs we need for the 21st Century. These efforts support the long-term strategic objectives of the Global War on Terrorism by building understanding and consensus on the terrorist threat, laying foundations for future “coalitions of the willing,” and extending our country’s security perimeter.

We look forward to working with the Members of this Committee as we assist in the development of effective security structures that are essential to our theater, our nation, and to our allies.

UNCLASSIFIED

7

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD**

APRIL 7, 2006

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER

The CHAIRMAN. How much does it cost to maintain a company of troops stationed in Germany versus a troop company in the continental United States (e.g., Fort Hood)?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Based on the Army's Force Cost Estimate Model, which captures base operations support, family housing, and sustainment of facilities, it costs the Army about \$2 million per year to maintain a troop company in Germany, compared to \$1 million per year in the United States, or about twice as much.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. SHUSTER. I think as Members of Congress we should know which of our allies are really pushing our envelope, or out there leading, or spending more money, or have been very cooperative with us. I wonder if you might talk about those in NATO or around the world that are doing just that, are being very helpful and supportive in this effort?

General JONES. Seven of twenty six NATO Alliance member countries spend two percent or more of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on total defense. They are: Bulgaria, France, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

